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In 1688, william Molyneux, an Irish philosopher and scientist speciali-
zingin optics, wrote a letter to John Locke in which he asked him a very
interesting and important question about the senses. Locke did not unr*".(and it is not known why not). Fortunately, Molyneux raised the question
again five years later in another letter. This time Locke respondedand he
did so with enthusiasm. He so much liked Molyneux's question that he in-
corporated it into the second edition of his Essay concerning Huntan (Jn-
derstanding (1694) and discussed it shortly. Here is the veriion from the
Essay which then became the starting point and main reference text of a
long and controversial discussion and which only very slightly differs from
Molyneux's version in the second letter and not much from ihe velsion of
the first letter:
Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his toLrch to clis-
tinguish between a Cr-rbe, ancl a Sphere of the same rnetal, and nighly of the
same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and t'other, which is the cube,
which the Sphere. Sr,rppose then the Cube and Sphere placed on a Table, and
the Blind Man to be
rnade to see. Quaet'e, Whether by his sight, before he touch'd thern, he could now
distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the cLrbe (Locke, Essay, II.9.g)r.
Cnplrulo 12
+ Swarthmore College.I Locke qr.rotes Molyneux, Letter to Locke, 2 March 1693,65l . Cf. also the earliel letter.by Moly-
neux: Molynetlx, I978, 482f . As overviews of the cliscussion on Molynenx's problem cf. Davis 1960,
Morgan 1977,Pachetie 1997, arñ especially Degenaal 1996.
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This quotation made the question famous; it has long been known under:
the name "Molyneux's Question". Not everyone would want to go as far aì
Emst Cassirer who thought that Molyneux's problem is the central probl
in 18'r' Century epistemology (cf. Cassirer I 951, 108Ð. But I think it certainlylì
is a very important problem with farreaching implications not just for ouÍ¡Í
way of thinking about the different senses but also about cognition
generally. lt is still very important today and there is not only au ongoing!ì
controversial philosophical discussion but there is also ongoing empiricàL:
research relevant to the question. :
r -:lil:Now, one might think that Molyneux's question is straightforward and,.1,
it is just the answer to it that would keep us busy. Unfortunately, it is notr;
quite like that: The question itself is in need of further specification in many*
respects. There is not just one way to interpret the question. And different I
authors have interpreted it in different ways2. One could even argue that the,.ll
full potential of Molyneux's question only became clearer later (with the::i
distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual mental representations). l
I arn going to start by taking a closer look at the question itself (1). Amongst 
'
those who answered the question in the negative or at least not in th-e.t:ì
positive, George Berkeley is of particular interest because he argued for
a very radical position. Most of his contribution to the discussion can be,
found in his Essay tr¡wards a New Theory o/'Visbn (cf. on this aspect or¡¡1,
Berkeley's work, e.g., Atherton 1990). I will give an exposition of his viewì
(2) and then move on to a critical discussion of this kind of view, 
-wha{one could call the "Berkeleian view" (3). I think that the problems of what
has become a standard negative answer to the question (mainly brought::¡l
forward by empiricists) become vely clear in Berkeley's case and one canrìì
also leam a lot frorn this.
The closer one looks, the more one can be tempted to speak of Molyneux'l
questions rather just Molyneux's question. To start with, Molyneux ts,'
ásking what wouid be the case aftei' the man has been made to see. But,
what ãxactly does seeing involve here? It seems relatively uncontroversial-.'l
that light of different iniensity and different wave-length (color) would fall
onto the person's retinas. Or, as Locke (cf, Locke, Essay, II.9.8) puts lt: ,
there is "colour" as well as "shadow" and different "degrees of light ano ,
blightness". This is, of course, not sufficient for seging: The eyes and thq',,;
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brain of the person also have to work in a certain way3. Now, after the
acquisition of vision, Molyneux's person would experience new mental
states and processes she was not able to experience before. She would be
able to see. But, again: What exacfly does seeing involve here? There are
three different main possibilities :
a) Molyneux's person acquires three-dimensional (3-D) visual
experiences;
b) she only acquires two-dimensional (2-D) visual experiencesa;
c) her new visual experiences lack any intentional content.
According to (c), the person would neither have 2-D nor 3-D vision.
she would see but she would not see something. In that sense, her visual
experience would be purely "subjective" (like, e.g., pain) (cf. Kant, KrV, A
3201 É 376 on subjective and objective perceptions).
(a), (b) and (c) are different answers to the question
(1) What kinds of visual experience does Molyneux's person acquire?
This question is not Molyneux's question. The question is not "What
does the person come to see?" but rather:
(2) Can Molyneux's person distinguish and tell (relying exclusively on
her vision) which object is the globe and which is the cube?
To be sure, the answer to (2) depends on the answer to (1). Hence, (1) is
relevant here. But it is not Molyneux's question. Let me say a bit about (2)
and its connection with (1).
A person who is able to tell globes from cubes (and to tell which is
which) ipsofacto has the concepts of globe and cube and is able to comectly
apply these concepts to objectss. To be sure, Locke, Berkeley and many
other contemporaries would rather speak of "abstract" or "general ideas"
than "concepts". One has to be careful when using a term like "concept"
Mo¡.y¡leux's Quesrroru ¡,¡lorrr¿ Bcnn,l I,tAN AN:jwER
3 Given the plausible thesis that there is no rnental diffelence without a physical or functional differ-
ence, it would be false to say that the eyes and blain of Molyneux's person work in exactly the same
way as the eyes and brain ofa person who has never been blind: In that case they would both have
the same kind of vision and Molyneux's question would not even arise.
a For the sake of sirnplicity, I neglect other fonns of vision, like Malr''s 2,5-D vision (cf. Marr 1982.,
268ff.). Molyneux and Locke celtainly did not think of snch possibilities.
5 Ifnot indicated otherwise, "application ofa coucept" will be used hele in the sense of"coLrect
application". That a person cau cort'ectly apply a collcept does not urcan that she always cor.r'ectly ap-
plies tlre concept, lrut that she does so in a sufficient uuurber of cases. Cf. Levin 1986,248-252 wlto
distinguishes between having a concept ancl being able to apply it; she uses this distinction (which l
do not find very ilh.uninating) in the context of a discussion of the Molyneux and the qualia pr.oblern.
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here because one might read a very different view of mental representation
(e.g., Kant's) into authors of an earlier period. Noq perhaps the ability to
make distinctions within one's visual field does not presuppose conceptual
abilities. However, Molyneux's question (2) clearly asks for more: namely
for the ability to identify objects as globes or cubes by sight. Ancl this
presupposes that the person has the concepts of globe and cube and can
apply them. According to the assumptions behind Molyneux's question, the
person can already distinguish globes and cubes by touch (which captures
three-dimensional spatial relations). 'We could also say that she already has
the concepts of globe and cube and that she can apply them based on her
three-dimensional tactile experiencesó. Molyneux's question can thus be
reformulated in the following way:
(3) Can Molyneux's person apply the concepts of globe and cube (which
' she already can apply based on tactile experience) by exclusive
reliance on her new visual experience?
Putting the question like this, though, makes it obvious that Berkeley
should have a problem even with accepting Molyneux's question. I will say
more about this later but want to already flag the problem up right now But
back to some basic aspects of Molyneux's question. Can the person apply
one and the same concept (of a globe and of a cube) both as exclusively
based on tactile experience and as exclusively based on visual experience?
The answer to Molyneux's question (3) depends, as I already pointed out,
on which of the alternative views (a), (b) or (c) one takes. If one accepts (c),
then obviously one has to deny the questionT. The concepts of globe and
cubeasappliedontlrebasisoftouchareobviouslyspatialnotions.
If one àccepts (b), the problem arises whether or how one can apply
concepts which arguably aie concepts of three-dimensional objects on the
basis òf two-dimensional (visual) inforrnation. This is related to but not
identical with the important question of how we get from 2-D vision to
3-D visions.
I propose to go with (a) here. This interpretation does not bring up. sider
issues und Uringi out the main problem in the most straightforward fashioni
As we will see, Berkeley would not agree with this but we will get back tÓ'
that. Like in the
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Molyneux's questione.
Some philosophers, like Diderot, hold that the main point of Molyneux's
question becomes clearer if one reformulates it and poses it as a problem
about two-dimensional rather than three-dimensional shapes (squáres and
circles rather than,cubes and globes)10. However, since the sensè of touch
appears to be essentially three-dimensional, and for the other reasons
mentioned above, I prefer to go with (a).
- 
one further question is whether the person has to answer imrnediately 
-when she might still be "dazzled and confused by the strangeness" (Leibniz,
Nouveaux Essais,II.9.8)- or can take her time. perhaps she needs some
time to adapt to the new circumstances (like our pupils when we suddenly
switch from brightness to darkness) (cf. Gregory l9B7,95). But is this really
an important question here? I do not think sorr. However, the question of
time.helps us to understand what the truly important question ii here: on
the basis of what can the person answer Molyneux's question? Almost all
authors agree that she will be able to do so sooner or later. But what kinds
of resources does she need to use in order to be able to answer the question?
One can distinguish two possible answers here:
L The visual experience, conceptual capacities and, perhaps, some a
priori reasoning are sufficient to tell which object is the globe and
which the cube;
il. In addition to that, the person also needs further experience and
some inductive reasoning (about the comelation between tactile and
visual experiences).
In both cases, one needs some experience in order to be able to tell the
globe from the cube. Hence, it is not quite true to say that the alternative
is between an empiricist and an apriorist answer to Molyneux's question.
However, it is not astonishing that empiricists tend to hól¿ (II)12 whereas
aNolls Btnr¡Lel¡ru A¡lswpn
e I do not intend to decide here the diffìcult intelpretatoly question of whether Molyneux or Locke
accepted (a), (b) or (c).
l0 cf. Diderot, Leth'e sur les aveugles, 314-330,325 and,following hirn, Evans 19g5,365. Mackie
1976,30-32 thinks that Locke would have answerecl the two-dimensional version of Molyner.rx's
question in the positive.
r' Cf', lrowever, Marks 1g78,23f .accolcling to whorn Molyneux's question has to be ¿enied þeca¡se
the person needs sotne time to able to answel it. Accolding to Belchielli 2002, 64, Locke would
agree.
D Cf. Locke, Es sq),lI.g.|whet'e he approvingly quotes Molyneux's answeL (cf. Molyneux, Letter to
L.ocke,2 March 1693, 651). Cf. also Berkeley, Nett, Tlteot.),ofW.sion,eô 41, 79, 128, 135; hc thinks
that Molyneux's person would not even be able to understand the problenr (cf. ibid., $ 135).
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apriorists rather tend to hold (I)r3. This allows us to reformulate (3) and give-,;iì
Molyneux's question a tnore precise fotm and will thus also enable us tQ.-
befiér understãnd the differenf un***tt givenla: ,.ii
(4) Can Molyneux's person apply the concepts of globe and cube lwhich;i:
she already can apply based on tactile experience) by exclusiveir;l
reliance on her new visual experience and, perhaps, some a priori,r,iì
reasoning (without further experience and inductive reasoning 
.:
concerning the comelation between tactile and visual experience)? :
What then should we say if it turned out that the person needs to touch
tlie objects before she can tell the globe from the cube by looking at it?
Suppose that touching the objects is a "merely causal" precondition for
the use of the new visual experience by the person. There could be such
a weird causal connection. This, however, would not constitute a reason
to deny Molyneux's question (a). Only if touching the objects is (also)
necessary because it delivers further information do we have a reason to
deny the question. In other words, Molyneux's question is a question about
justification: Does the person have sufficient information to tell cube from
globe? Molyneux's question is not a descriptive, "de facto" question but
iather a justificatory, "de jure" questionr5. That Molyneux's question should
be taken in a de jure way, has not always been made clear enoughr6.
13 Ct. (with respect to a weakel version of Molyneux's question): Leibniz, Nottt,eaux E,ssaís,IL9.8.
14 Cf. fol a sinrilar way to put it: Evans 1985, 366. Campbe ll 1996a,302-304 argues that externalistn
abont mental contetìt suggests a positive answer to Molyueux's question. This, however, seems tg
rniss the point of Molyneux's ploblern: It presupposes that the relevant content is accessible to the
person; hence, the question pl'esupposes some kind of couteut iuterualism. Cf. also the discussion
betrveen Loar 1996, Ludwig 1996 and Carnpbell 1996b.
ls Cf. Kant, KrV, A 84/ B I I 6. It cloes not nrattel here whethel we choose au "irrternalist" or an "ex-
telnalist" cor.rception of justification (cf. Kornblith 200l , I -9).
l(, Cf. lrowevel Evans 1985,376-378. 
--We have to rnake celtain rather obvious backgt'ound as-
surrptions: The conclitions of pelception are normal (wlratever that means in detail), there are no
tlicks or pelcephral illusions involved, the objects are close et.rongh and visible ft'om a normal per'
spective, etc.- There are further questions about the conditiot.ts undel which Molyneux's person.is
prrt to t|e test. Filst: Does she know in advance that she will see two objects, one of them aglobe
ancl one of tl.reur a cube? If yes, it will, of course, be easiel fol her to pass the test. I will.focus here
o¡ the stronger rather than the weakel version of Molyneux's sceuario and assume that the person
docs not know in aclvancc that a cube and a globe will be plesented to lìer. Thct'e seems nothing in
Ber.keley which woulcl suggcst that he hacl the weaker versiou in rnind. Intelestingly, Leibniz affirrns
the weakel velsion of tlre question ancl denies the stlongel vet'siot-t: cf . Leibniz, Nouveaux Essats'
IL9.8 (tr'.: Petet' Retnuant/ Jonathan Bennett).
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Not long after Locke hacl published Molyneux's question in his Essay,
the discussion about it was fuelled by new empirical data. In 1728, william
Cheselden, an English surgeon, published a report about two successful
cataract operations he had done on the eyes of a l3- or I|-year-old boyr7.
The boy had been bom blind or had lost his sight very early. He acquired
vision after surgery. Apparently, Cheselden did not know about Molyneux's
problern but his report is still very interesting in this context. Strictly speaking,
persons with cataract like Cheselden's boy are not completely blind: Their
retinas are still functional; they can usually perceive broad differences in
brightness and can vaguely recognize hand movements directly in front
of their eyes. This, however, does not seem to make a relevant difference
here. Cheselden's patient might have had vision as a vely young infant but,
according to Cheselden's title, this would have been "so early, that he had
no Remembrance of ever having seen".
Cheselden reports that "When he first saw, he was [...] far fiom making
any Judgment about Distances"; "he could form no Judment of their
[objects'] shape [...] He knew not the Shape of any Thing, nor any one
Thing from another, however different in Shape, or Magnitude". Cheselden
did not present cubes and globes to hirn but had something to report about
cats and dogs: "Having often forgot which was the Cat, andwhich the Dog,
he was asham'd to ask; but catching the Cat (which he knew by feeling)
he was observ'd to look at her steadfastly, ancl then setting her down, saiã,
So Puss! I shall know you another Time" (Cheselden, Account, 448). As
Molyneux, Locke, and others would have said: He already knew how a
cat or a dog "affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained the Experience,
that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so'i (Locke,
Essay,II.9.8)rs.
. 
After cheselden, there have been much more directly or indirectly
relevant empirical data (and not just observations fi"om case studies but alsô
lrom systernatic experiments). Most of the recent data rather seem to suggest
a different morale. However, many contemporaries took cheselden s as
confirmation of the negative answer to Molyneux's question. Now, it is not
quite clear in what sense this is an empirical question and in what sense it
tsn't. But from the start, there have been philosophical responses to it.
BeRxelern¡l At¡swens
Molvr.trux's Qur,s'rron ¡¡lol I r Ilen x eLul,cN Altsu,¿n
'? Cf. Cheselclen, Account. On Cheselclen's opelation aud other early opelations cf. Degenaar 1996,
llt 4. Fot an extensive overview ovel opelations until 1 930 cf. Sel.rden 1 932, passim and especially
8-82 ancl 82-111. He thinks that the data suggest a negative arlswel to Molyncnx's questiotr. For a Iist
ofcases nntil 1930 cf. Scnden 1932,304.Cf. fol later case studies Valvo 197l.
-. Cheselden aclcls that the boy had difficr¡lties seeing realistic pictnres as leplcsenting something (cf.
Cheselden, Account, 449).
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the one given by Molyneux himself and approvingly quoted by Locke: ,.:¡
The classical argument for a negative answer to Molyneux's quest
Not. For though he has obtain'd the experience of, how a Globe, how a
affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained the Expelience, that what afféì:
his touch so ol'so, rnust affect his sight so or so; Or that a protuberant aú
in thé Cube. that plessed his hand uneqLrally. shall appear to his eye, as
and radicalized tlrc ideas behind Locke's and Molyneux's answer (wtft
ln lris ,Essay towards a New Theory of I/ision, Berkeley further developè-d
echos in the Principles, the Three Dialogtes and early anticipations in thê
does in the Cube (Locke, Essay, I1.9.8).
P h ilo s op h ical Commenî ar ies).
First, we should stress that Berkeley did not choose option (a) abov*
according to him, Molyneux's person does not enjoy 3-D vision. The reasorl:,ì
is sirnply that we can, strictly speaking, not see distance or distant objects;
[...] so that in truth and strictness ofspeech I neithel see distance itsef$
the objects of sigltt; they are
not otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear (Berkeley, New Theory
of Vision, $$ 45-46. Cf. also $$ 126, 154, as well as Principles, $ 44;
Three D ial o gu es, 20 l. P h i l os op h i c a l C otn nt en tat"i es, 21 5. ln Ph il o s oph i cal
Comtnentaries 32, he says: "Molyneux's Blincl tnan woulcl not know the
sphere or cube to be boclies ol extended at first sight").
The irnplications for Molyneux's person are clear. Berkeley points out
[...] that a rnan bom blind, being macle to see, would, at first, have no idea of
distance by sight (Berkeley, New Theor¡' of Vision, $ 4l).
Because we do not have visual ideas of distance we also do not have
visual ideas of three-dimensional objects (cf. Berkel ey, New Theory of
Vision, $ 154, 133). In one paragraph of the Essay towards a New Theoty
of Visíon Berkeley even seems tõ däny that one cân have two-dimensional
visual ideas. A being which has no sense of touch but only one of vision
could never attain to know so rnuch as the fir'st elernents of plane geometry'
And pelhaps upon a nice enquiry it will be fourcl he cannot even have an
idea of pláne figures any more than he can of solicls; since some idea of
distance is necessaly to fonn the idea of a geometrical plane (Berkeley'
224
nor anything that I take to be at a distance. I say, neither distance nor things ,
placed at a distance are thetnselves, or theil ideas, truly perceivecl by sight. I
[...] From what we have shewn it is a manifest conseqnence that the ideas ,
ofspace, outness, and things placed at a distance are not, strictly speaking;'$
,:l:
New Theor¡t of Vision, $ 155; cf. also $$ 157-158. Cf. also Philosophical
Commentaries,32).
However, this latter idea seems to go to far for Berkeley's own theoly:
The way he describes the "naked" visual experience seems to require at least
two-dimensional visual ideas (cf. Wilson 1999,261 but also Schumacher
2007).
If distance or three-dimensional objects are not what we see, what then
do we see? Berkeley says:
All that is properly perceived by the visive faculty amounts to no rnore than
colonrs, with their variations and different ploportions of light and shade
(Berkeley, New Theorlt o.f Vi.sion, $ 156; cf. $$ 103, 129-130).
Berkeley acknowledges again and again that we tend to think that we
can see three-dimensional objects. However, this is an illusion. We can
even find the beginning of an emor-theory in his writings which prefigure
very similar accounts in Hume later. It is experience which establishes a
regularity connection, a close correlation between the ideas of sight and the
spatial, three-dimensional ideas of touch. The close "association" makes us
think that we can really see distance and distant objects when really we can
only feel that (cf. Berkeley, New Theory of Vision,0$ 41, 45-46). Only in a
"secondary" sense (non-strictly) can we say that we see three-dimensionally
(cf. Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, $ 50).
What matters with respect to Molyneux's question is not so much the
details of Berkeley's story about apparent 3-D vision and basic vision (as
one could call it). Rather, what is most crucial is Berkeley's idea that our
"tactile" concepts are radically different fiom our "visual" concepts ancl that
a touched object is not and cannot be identical with any seen object:
But if we take a close and accurate view of things, it rnust be acknowleclged
that we never see and feel one and the sarne object. That which is seen is
one thing, and that which is felt is another. If the visible figure and extension
be not the same with the tangible figule and extension, we are not to infer
that one and the same thing has divers extensions. The true consequence is
that the objects of sight and touch are two distinct things. It rnay pelhaps
require some thought rightly to conceive this distinction. And the difficulty
seems not a little increased, because the cornbination of visible ideas hath
constantly the sarne rlalne as the cornbination of tangible ideas wherewith it
is connected: which doth of necessity arise frorn the r,rse ancl encl of language
(Berkeley, New Theory of'Vision, $ 49)'0.
Mouyrueux's Quesrron ¡,norne B¿tr¡Ler¡,N Ar{swen
lt, at OS 46. 50, I I l, 136, Pt'inciple,s g 44,Three Dialogue.s,245, Philo,so¡thical Contnretttarie,s,226,¿27. See also the slightly different eally rerrark itr Philo,sophical Cottttnenlat'ie.s,29:"Motion, figure
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A bit later, Berkeley makes his point even more drastically:
That which I see is only variety of light and colours. That which I feel is hald
or soft, hot or cold, rougl.rt or smooth. What similitude, what connexion have
those ideas with these? Or how is it possible that anyone should see l'eason
to give one and the sarne name to combinations of ideas so very different
befor'e he hacl experienced theil coexistence? (Berkeley, New Theory of
Vision, $ 103. See on this point Wilson 1999).
Berkeley stresses that there is not even a resemblance between ideas of
sight and ideas of touch (Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, $ 117). Since
there is nothing in cotnmon between these kinds of ideas, there also cannot
be an abstract idea of extension based thereupon; Berkeley puts forward his
fanrous critique of abstract ideas in this context, too (Berkeley, New Theory
'o.f Vision, çç 122-123,129-130, and especially 127). This shuts the door for
any attempt to answer Molyneux's question in the positive. Accordingly,
Berkeley remarks with respect to it that
And:
a nan bour blind would not at first reception of his sight think the things
he say were of the same nature with the objects of tonch, or hacl anything
in cornrnon with thern; but that they were a new set of ideas, perceived in a
new lnanner, and entirely different fi'orn all he had perceived before: so that
he would not call thern by the same narne, rlol' repute thern to be of the same
sort with anything he had hitherto known (Berkeley, New Theor¡t of Vision,
$ 128; cf. $$ 106, 133, 135-l36,Three Dialogues,202).
It is experience, according to Berkeley, which establishes a contingent
correlation between the ideas of vision and the ideas of touch, - lacking
any necessary oonnection between the two (cf. Berkeley, New Theory of
Visiort, $$ 103-106, 1I0, Principles $ 44, Three Dialogues,202). And this
contingent relation we mistake for identity:
how gleat an inequality soevel'there may in our apprehension seetn to be
betwixt those two things, because of the customary and close connexion that
has glown up in our rninils between the objects of sight and touch; whereby
the very diffelent ancl clistinct ideas of those two senses are so blended and
confouncled together as to be mistaken for one and the sarne thing; or.rt of
a man born blind and tnade to see would, at first opening of his eyes, [...] 
.,'..1,..-¡|.!.
not consider the ideas of sight with refelence to, or as having any connection 
-.,-1
witlr, tlre ideas of touch (Berkeley, New TheorSt oJ'Vision, $ 79).
has to say
Very similar
whichri
plzzling: 
,,li
o.f Vi,
& extension ¡rerceivable by sight are cliffelent fionr those icleas perceivecl by touch which go by the
sar.ne nane". (cf. also ibicl.,49)
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which prejudice we cannot easily extricate ourselves (Berkeley, New Theorlt
of Vision, $ 79).
Very similar kinds of arguments we later find in Hume. What Berkeley
has to say about the role of language here is both very interesting and
puzzling:
And the difficulty seerns not a little incleased, because the combination of
visible ideas hath constantly the satne naûre as the combination of tangible
ideas wherewith it is connected: which doth of necessity arise frorn the use
and end of language (Belkeley, New Theory of Visiott, $ 49; cf. also Three
Dialogues,245).
Why is it necessary to use one and the same word if the two kinds of
ideas are really radically different fiom each other?
Even more ptzzling is the following remark which seems incompatible
with everything else Berkeley is saying and makes him seem very close
to Leibnizian arguments for a positive answer to Molyneux's question (cf.
Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, II.9.8):
I answer it must be acknowledged the visible square is fitter than the visible
circle to lepresent the tangible square, but then it is not because it is liker,
ol' Ílore of a species with it, but because the visible sqnare contains in it
several distinct palts, whereby to rnark the several distinct collesponding
parts of a tangible square, whereas the visible circle doth not. The square
perceived by touch hath four distinct, equal sides, so also hath it four distinct
equal angles. lt is thelefore necessary that the visible figure which shall be
most proper to rnark it contains foul distinct equal parts correspouding to the
four sides of the tangible square, as likewise four other distinct ar-rd equal
parts whereby to denote the foul equal angles of the tangible square. And
accordingly we see the visible figures contain in them distinct visible palts,
answeling to the distinct tangible parts of the figures signified ol suggested
by them (Belkeley, Nev, Theory ofVision, $ 142)'
I must confess that I cannot think of an interpretation of this passage
which would make it fit with the rest of Berkeley's remarks on the topic. It
is hard to see how he could make this remark.
PRoeLerus
Mol-y¡le ux's Quesrron n¡'roltp. B¡.nKELn,r¡¡ Ansrvsn
Where does all this leave Berkeley or a Berkeleian stauce on Molyneux's
Þroblem? One rnight want to say that nobody could be more decisive in
their negative answer to Molyneux's question. But things are not quite as
straightforward as they might look at first sight. It is not even clear whether
Eerkeley can accept Molyneux's question or rather would have to reject it
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as basically mistaken. lt is interesting in this context that Berkeley
the following remark in passing:
a blind rnan from his biLth would not, at first sight, denorninate anythi
saw by the names he had been used to applopriate to ideas of touch;
sect. 106. Cube, sphere, table at'e words he has known applied to:thi
perceivable to touch, but to things perfectly intangible he never knew
applied. [...] ln short, the ideas of sight are all new perceptions to vyfil
there be rlo nalnes annexed in his mind: he cannot therefore understand
is said to him concerning them: and to ask of the two bodies he saw
on the table, which was the sphere, which the cube? Were to hirn a questi
understand the question but Berkeley himself cannot accept the
Molyneux is asking. V/hy not?
I think Berkeley is right here. Furthermore, not only could the person not,
downright bantering and unintelligible (Berkeley, New Theory of Vision,,
r 3s).
object as a globe or cube when these very concepts have already been use.d!
Molyneux's question concerns the possibility of recognizing a
on a tactile basis. This, however, is not possible, according to Berkeley. N0È
tactile concept is identical with any visual concept. I
Can he reformulate the question in a way which would be acceptable t0,Ì,:
him? FIe would have to index the predicates "globe" and "cube" to sense,'.Î
modalities ("V" and "t"). Furthermore, he does assume that for no predicate:*
Suppose a Man bom blind, and now adttlt, ancl taught by his touch to'
distinguish between a Cube-t, ancl a Sphere-t of the satne tnetal, and nighly'
of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and t'other; which is the
Cube-t, which the Sphele-t. Suppose then the Cube-t and Sphere-t placed:
on a Table, and the Blind Man to be macle to see. Quaere, Whether by his
sight, before he touch'd thern, he coulcl now distirguish, and tell, which iq
the Globe-v, which the Cube-v.
Or, to make it even clearer that tactile and visual objects and concepts
are fundamentally different, let us use diffèrent tetms for the seen objects,
"X" and "Y":
Suppose a Man born blind, and now aclult, and taught by his touch to
distingr,rish between a Cube-t, ancl a Sphere-t of the satne metal, and nighly
of the same bigness, so as to tell, wherr he felt one and t'other, which is the
Cube-t, which the Sphere-t. Sr.rppose then the Cube-t and Sphere-t placed ott
a Table, anil the Blind Man to be tnade to see. Quaere, Whether by his sight'
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before he touch'd thern, he could now distingr.rish, and tell, which is the X,
which the Y.
This, however, has very little, if anything to do with Molyneux's
question. It does not even make sense. We should therefore not see Berkeley
as someone who proposed a negative answer to Molyneux's question but
rather as someóne who blocked the question from the beginning. Insofar
Berkeley differs very much from Molyneux and Locke20. But doesn't
Berkeley sometimes give us the impression that he wants to answer that
question? And shouldn't he be able to do so? One might reply that Berkeley
draws the carpet away under Molyneux's question. But this cúts the other
way, too: Perhaps his inability to even formulate the question speaks against
his theory?
There are also more general questions 
-not necessarily specific toBerkeley's view on Molyneux- which deserve to be mentioned. I want to
go into two of them. First some comments on Berkeley's ideas about the
correlation between visual and tactual ideas. The experience of a correlation
between certain types of tactual experience and certain types of visual
experience will never give us more than just that, 
-a comelation. If the twotypes of experience are indeed totally different, and if we make the further
assumption that visual experience in itself is non-spatial or at least not three-
dimensional, then it is hard to see how we should ever get to spatial, two- or
even three-dimensional vision out of that correlation. This seems excluded
by even the basic assumptions of the Berkeleian argument.
Closely connected with this is the further point that for the Berkeleian,
visual experience will always consist of what Kant called "sensation", a
"percepîion that refers solely to the subject, viz., as the modification of
the subject's state" (like pain, for instance); we will not get to "objective
perceptions", that is, to representations of objects (Kant, KrV A 3201 B
376). Whaf we need for that, is reference to more than two-dimensional
objects. When Berkeley talks about "the objects of sight" (Berkeley, New
Theory of Vision, $ 49), he does not mean "object" in the usual sense. Our
visual experience is, given the tserkeleian argument, not the experience
of an objective world but rather a subjective experience that conelates
Itt mysterious ways with objective tactile experiences. According to the
Berkeleian argument, Molyneux's person could perhaps be made to see but
not to see something. And even if there were some kind of mechanism that
would lead to objective and spatial visual experience, the link could not be
based on transfel of information and would lack all justification. Given that
we have objective and spatial visual experience, the Berkeleian theory looks
Molvrl¡ux's QursnoN ANDTT{E BF.tìKELEInl A¡rsu,e n
'0 On a comparison of Locke's and Belkeley's reaction to Molyueux's ¡rroblern cf., among othels,
Park I 969.
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like a non-starter. A similar problem also arises for Locke and Molyneux
they do not go with option (a) above and assume that visual experiences aÍê!
three-dimensional from the start. ,'
both Berkeley's views and the less radical ones by Locke and others (whdit
did not assume that the ideas of sight and touch have nothing whatsoever in '
The second problem I wanted to mention goes a bit further and concerns
common). Suppose visual and tactile representations of globes (or cubéSìî
are indeed so different that the person cannot identify seen and touchéd:
globes (or cubes) without further inductive expelience. Molyneux's person,
would have to start with very different (tactual and visual) experiences and
induction would tell her that there is a correlation between the two types of'
experiences. Is this sufficient for the characteristic unity of our experiencð,
as the experience of clne world? How would Molyneux's person experience
the world? She would visually experience a class of objects A and tactually
experience a class of objects B, and she would also find that there is a
correlation between As and Bs. But there seems to be one important thing
she cannot find out by induction: namely, that particular As are identical
with particular Bs. It is hard to see how she should be able to find out that
her visual and her tactile experience of the same object are indeed different
experiences of the same object. The person would rather live in a Berkeleian
"double world": one world fllled up with tactile things and the other world
filled up with visual things. There would be a clear conelation but she could
not find out that it is just one and the same world. Or, at least: Nothing
would justify her in believing that. Moreover, we would have a good reason
even to doubt that her experieuce would be of something objective2''
Given that our experience of the world is the experience of one, objective
world, the experiential comelation scenario is a non-starter. It seems
that we need at least some very basic closs-modal perception (certainly
allowing for differences between sensual modalities) in order to be able to
have the experience that we do in fact have. It seems that the objectivity
of our experience presupposes its unity which in turn presupposes some
cross-modality. It is interesting to see how close one gets to Kant if one
thinks about these things22. Even though Kant has apparentlynot dealt with
¡4olYneux's
in his Phil
seems fair to
Whatever w-e
problematic but'
Molyneux's que
2r Cf. Eilan 1993,246-251u4ro holds that the idea of an external, mind-indepenclent world requires
solne cross-modality of ltlace represelìtation. Her atgumeut for this thesis does lot palallel the above
argurîeut. Ganeri 2000, 647 argues in the opposite direction: Cross-modal experience ofan object
presupposes that one's experience is of an objective world which it.t turn presltpposes the idea of a
nurnelically identical self.
22 Cf .,of course Kant, Kl'V A 95ff., B l29ff .I leave the question open how close to Kant we should
or neccl to get.
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Molyneux's question23, we can find important resources for an answer to it
in his philosophy2a.
Whatever we think of Kantian approaches to the Molyneux problem, it
seems fair to say that Berkeley's or a Berkeleian position is not only very
problematic but also sheds some skeptical light on other ways of answering
Molyneux's question in the negative.
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